Antichron

It was a joint BA/MA program where we took a year's worth of Ph.D-level classes. (Basically, two core sequences, a grad-level history class, and two other classes at either the undergrad or grad level. More info here: UCLA Economics). I'm not sure how common these programs are, but I thought it was a great opportunity to learn some graduate-level economics before starting the Ph.D.

More evidence is always more convincing than less, but I think it is our job to remain at least slightly skeptical of everything. :)

I imagine kkaman is referring to the identification assumptions. Empirical work necessarily relies on some sort of untestable (outside the laboratory) exogeneity assumption and, in interpreting the results, on some sort of external validity assumption (especially within the laboratory). From a practical perspective, the implication of the former is that one of the econometrician's primary jobs becomes convincing the (rightfully extremely skeptical) audience that his/her empirical strategy identifies the appropriate causal effect, and this always comes down to some sort of a judgement call. From a philosophical perspective, this suggests that empirical work can never truly get after some sort of deep "truths" about causal relationships between economic variables. I am sympathetic to this latter viewpoint, but in the end, some empirical evidence (if carefully established) is much better than no empirical evidence, but in light of the limitations under which empiricists operate, no empirical study should move your posterior about a point of view to one of the extremes.

That's exactly right. :)

The way economics progresses is exactly by (1) pointing out deficiencies in current ways of thinking, (2) showing how it is inconsistent with empirical evidence (i.e. that people make time inconsistent choices), and (3) proposing an alternative model that captures this (i.e. Phelps-Pollak, 1968) in a way that makes additional testable predictions (i.e. that there is scope for commitment mechanisms (Laibson, 1997) and we should see them in the data). I noticed that when I was taking undergraduate economics courses, there was a lot of (1) and (2) going on, but very little (3), and from the comments in this thread, it appears that I wasn't alone. However, I think the difference between scientific progress and scientific regress is exactly (3).

Keyu Jin is female. :)

Just some random thoughts: Though my views on the way economics is practiced are undoubtedly Cambridged-biased, I think there may be some confusion in this thread about the role of economic theory in our understanding of economic behavior as well as some confusion about the allocation of tasks within the discipline. I can't speak for how macroeconomics is done (simply my own ignorance), but my understanding of how micro works is that there are essentially four types of microeconomists: pure theorists, applied theorists, empirical economists, and policy people (and many economists wear multiple hats). Pure theorists typically generate (and characterize properties of) tools and frameworks. Applied theorists use these tools to construct and analyze models that explain real-world phenomena (that have typically been documented elsewhere) when existing models prove to be insufficient. A careful applied theorist should think long and hard about any assumptions that go into his/her model, and a strong goal should be parsimony (reducing the model to its key elements and nothing more) and tractability so that others can embed the model in a more realistic context. Empirical economists are the ones who take a model and adapt it to a particular setting (accounting for the key elements of the relevant institutions), generating empirical predictions which they then test (econometrically). (Experimental people often test the primitives of a model more directly.) Policy people are the ones who have a connection with the real world and understand well the institutional detail in place in a particular setting and, in suggesting policy, should be aware of the relevant empirical work supporting whatever claims they may make. Additionally, there is a substantial amount of interaction in the opposite direction as well. People with closer connections with the real world are the ones who document facts that shape the direction of applied theory. This often necessitates the development of theoretical tools for handling situations not usefully analyzed with the current set of tools. Obviously a model that is not falsifiable has no place in any of this. The same need not necessarily be true about a framework that itself is not falsifiable (e.g. game theory), since the models generated using such a framework should have empirical predictions. To make a long story short, it isn't the people that axiomatically derive preferences that are the ones advising the government about what its tax policy should look like. It is not to say that they are not the ones writing op-eds and getting quoted in newspapers, though.

LSE's placement info is here: PhD Job Candidates Dave Donaldson is coming to MIT next year. :-)

For what it's worth, when I was applying to graduate schools, the first drafts of my SOP originally mentioned specific professors I would have liked to work with, but my letter writer urged me to remove them in the end. He had been on admissions committees in the past and said something along the lines of, "If you mention professors in my field and they're not me, then I'm unhappy. If you mention me, then I feel like I'm being manipulated." I'm not sure how common this sentiment is, but I'd definitely ask your undergrad. adviser for his/her opinion.

PHD Comics: Grades don't matter That said, I do believe that doing well in classes in your field is pretty important for developing future relationships with professors who will eventually be your advisers. Additionally, some places consider GPA for determining funding in later years. (UCLA used to have this policy, at least.)

I definitely hope he's up for being one of three presumably unrelated grad. students at MIT with the same surname. :)

I have heard rumors of offers being rescinded for bad conduct, but definitely not for a B or a C in a math class. I'd be totally shocked if they rescinded anything. :)

Congrats, jeeves! :-)

The toilets are not made of diamond, but the urinals are made of marble, at least on the top floor of Littauer. Congrats on your admit, by the way. :)

Ouch! Did you at least get this cleared up?

I overheard at the coffee machine that MIT Econ. will be notifying admits next week (perhaps early in the week). You didn't hear it from me, though! Good luck, everyone!

Congrats, everyone! :-)

I'd be apprehensive about any single post on gradcafe. When any school starts notifying its admits, gradcafe usually has dozens of posts in a row about that school, and people on testmagic will say something as well. Plus it's early. :-)

Some big names in this literature are Chiappori, Salanie, Einav, and Finkelstein.

On the static side, I believe some of the more seminal papers are Holmstrom's "Moral Hazard and Observability," "Moral Hazard in Teams," and Holmstrom and Milgrom's "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses." On the dynamic side in discrete time, there is a good amount of work on renegotiation as well as relational contracts (see Levin's "Relational Incentive Contracts" - though this is a combination of adverse selection and moral hazard) Yuliy Sannikov has been dealing with repeated moral hazard in continuous time, which I think is the state of the art stuff right now.

Happy new year!

LOL. I totally agree. :) In any case, don't worry about that number.

It's quite a long calm (unless you're on the job market). :-)

Merry Christmas everyone! :-)

I believe Stanford funds everyone they admit, and they fund them quite generously, so this shouldn't be an issue.